Dealing with plurality in scientific practice: the case of international political economy

Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by philosophers (e.g., Chang, Longino, Mitchell, Waters and Wylie) as well as social scientists. Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. First, we want to clarify the variety of philosophical versions of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy (e.g., aggregative, deliberative, participatory, agonistic or antagonistic) – stipulating the desired social-epistemic interaction among the plurality of research approaches in different ways. Second, we analyze the recent debate about the desired interaction among the plurality of research approaches, or ‘schools’, in the discipline of International Political Economy (IPE). This debate was triggered by a paper of Benjamin Cohen (2007) in which he presents a way of slicing up the field of IPE in different schools as well as a proposal for its future development. The many reactions this paper provoked provide us with a clear insight into how scientific pluralism is understood by social scientists and how to implement it (see, e.g., the collection of papers in Phillips and Weaver (2011) and the 20th anniversary issue of the Review of International Political Economy (2013); also see Sil and Katzenstein’s (2010) account of analytic eclecticism). Scrutinizing this debate will clarify what social scientists themselves consider to be the ideal interaction among the multiplicity of research approaches (schools, theories, models, …). Further, the confrontation with the different philosophical accounts of scientific pluralism discussed in the first part of the paper enables us to make the social scientists’ accounts more explicit as well as evaluate and refine the strengths and weaknesses of the philosophical accounts – helping us to spell out more carefully how different research approaches interact in the most productive way possible. References Cohen, B.J. (2007) ‘The Transatlantic Divide: Why Are American and British IPE So Different?’ Review of International Political Economy 14(2): 197-219. Phillips, N. and C. Weaver (eds.) (2011) International Political Economy. Debating the Past, Present and Future. New York: Routledge. Sil, R. and P. Katzenstein (2010) Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. Van Bouwel, J. (2009) ‘The Problem with(out) Consensus. The Scientific Consensus, Deliberative Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism.’ In: J. Van Bouwel (ed.) The Social Sciences and Democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.121-142. Van Bouwel, J. (2015) ‘Towards Democratic Models of Science: Exploring the Case of Scientific Pluralism.’ Perspectives on Science 23(2): 149-172

'Beyond consensus? A Reply to Alan Irwin.'

This paper is a rejoinder to Alan Irwin's constructive response "Agreeing to Differ?" to our (2017) paper. We zoom in on the three main issues Irwin raises, namely (a) How to understand consensus? (b) Why are so many public participation activities consensus-driven? (c) Should we not value the art of closure, of finding ways to make agreements, particularly in view of the dire state of world politics today? We use this opportunity to highlight and further develop some of our ideas

Dealing with values in science: kinds, roles and/or procedures

In this paper, we inquire how the eternal tension between science and values has been tackled in philosophy of science by analysing three different strategies that have been used: (a) focussing on different kinds of values (e.g. epistemic vs. non-epistemic values) and allowing some of these kinds to be present in science (e.g. epistemic values); (b) stipulating the role values are allowed to play (e.g. an indirect, but not a direct role); and, (c) specifying a social procedure in order to deal with values in science. Recently, the distinction between the direct and indirect role values could play in science and expertise was elaborated extensively by Heather Douglas, allowing values to play an indirect role. We scrutinize Douglas' account and claim that identifying the different roles of values in science faces similar problems as earlier philosophical accounts distinguishing kinds of values, cf. epistemic and non-epistemic values (see, e.g., Kuhn, McMullin and Laudan). The problems discussed concern (1) interpreting, (2) weighing, (3) variety of, and (4) distinguishing the kinds/roles of values in science. Furthermore, we investigate whether some of these problems, rather than by the kinds-of-values-approach or Douglas' roles-of-values-approach, could be addressed by stipulating a social procedure in order to deal with values in science and expertise (e.g., Helen Longino's demand for critical interaction respecting the four CCE-norms would be example of such an approach), or, whether combining two or all three of the strategies would help us developing a satisfying account of values in science

What can democratic theory teach us about scientific pluralism, objectivity and consensus?

Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of knowledge systems in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers of science (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006, Kitcher 2002, Longino 2002, Mitchell 2009, and Chang 2010). Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. We want to clarify the different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy – our taxonomy of models of democracy is mainly inspired by the work of Chantal Mouffe. Drawing on the parallels between models of scientific pluralism and models of democracy, we can articulate how the plurality of knowledge systems in science should interact within a democratic framework as well as how to cultivate multiple knowledge systems without getting stranded in relativism or ending up in an unwanted monism. Furthermore, democratic theory – i.e. theories of democracy – can help us stipulating how different research traditions or knowledge systems can interact in the most productive way possible, constituting the most objective account possible (understanding objectivity as social process). Finally, analyzing the symmetries between models of science and models of democracy will also shine light on the ideal of the scientific consensus (cf. Beatty 2006, Moore & Beatty 2010). As a case-study, we scrutinize how we could use such a democratic framework to understand the plurality of models in economics, including, for instance, the debate among the orthodoxy and the heterodoxy in that discipline (cf. Van Bouwel, 2009)

Different understandings of scientific pluralism in social science: inquiring a controversy within international political economy

In this paper, I analyse a controversy that is taking place within the (relatively young) discipline of International Political Economy (IPE). This very lively controversy was triggered by a paper of Benjamin J. Cohen (2007), which offers us a way of slicing up the field (a dichotomy of American versus British approaches to IPE) as well as a proposal for the future development of IPE as an academic discipline. The many reactions this paper provoked (more than 20 articles in journals up to now), provide us with an exceptionally clear insight into the self-understanding of a discipline, and in particular into issues of (un)desired pluralism, heterodoxy, synthesis, dialogue, mainstream, etc. (see, for instance, Helleiner, 2009; McNamara, 2009; Palan, 2009; Phillips, 2009). The importance for philosophers of social science of undertaking such a case-study is threefold. First, the analysis of the controversy will clarify what social scientists themselves consider as the ideal approach towards the multiplicity of approaches in their field (‘schools’, theories, models, research programs, …); is it coexistence, some form of interaction, or a synthesis of competing approaches? And, how would they translate that ideal into practice? Second, this case-study helps us to test and further our philosophies of social science, in particular in relation to the issue of scientific pluralism – different understandings of (the ideal of) scientific pluralism can be made explicit in the contributions of participants to the IPE-discussion. These understandings are compared with philosophical accounts of scientific pluralism (cf., e.g., Longino, 2006; Mitchell, 2009; Van Bouwel, 2009a and 2009b). Through this comparison, we evaluate the philosophical accounts and make the IPE-contributions more explicit. Which brings us to the third point; the feedback into the social science. Some contributions to the IPE-controversy might benefit from philosophical explications (as concerns the problems of, for instance, conceptual exclusion, strategic pluralism, hermeneutic injustice, consensus/synthesis, etc.). Thus, the relevance of philosophical accounts for the practice of social science will be demonstrated by showing how they help making the intuitions of IPE-scholars present in their contributions more explicit, improve the self-understanding of the field and enable the elaboration of better legitimations of visions on the future development of the discipline

Plans of pluralism: comments on 'explanatory pluralism in psychiatry'

In this paper, I comment on Raffaella Campaner’s (forthcoming) overview of the debate on explanatory pluralism in psychiatry. In her overview, Campaner distinguishes between, on the one hand, pluralists that consider pluralism to be a temporary state and, on the other hand, pluralists that consider it to be a persisting state. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two plans of pluralism, i.e. different understandings of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry, namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism (cf. Mitchell 2002, 2009) and interactive pluralism (cf. Van Bouwel 2009). Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure a “genuine dialogue” or shape “the pluralistic attitude”? As tentative answers a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism (cf. De Vreese et al. 2010; Van Bouwel & Weber 2002, 2008) as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations (cf. Longino 2002; Van Bouwel 2009) are explored